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The City University of New York
Graduate Center: 33 West 42 Street, New York, N. Y. 10036
212/790-4268



Institute on the United Nations

10 April 1975

Dear Jerry -

Enclosed a copy of my
latest report to the Secretary.

Best regards,

J. J. H. H. H.

The City University of New York
Graduate Center: 33 West 42 Street, New York, N. Y. 10036

212/790-4395



April 10, 1975

Dear Henry:

Rabin's answer to Elie Wiesel and me was "no, not now" to our request for a more forthcoming letter to you. What was interesting about the Rabin message, however, and constructive in my opinion was that he left the door open, because he added the phrase, "wait a little." It should be most interesting to see in this connection whether Allon will indicate a new flexibility to you during his visit. Logically, the Israelis should be prepared to take the initiative to give back all of Sinai in exchange for some real progress, instead of arguing about a few kilometers of desert.

I do not know whether the developments on the Israeli side during the next few days will encourage you to resume the "shuttle" once again. If you do, Elie Wiesel and I can probably continue to be useful to you with Rabin. Elie is willing to go to Israel and make another personal appeal on your behalf. Hans Morgenthau, in my opinion, at worst will not harm your position in Israel, and at best may even help. There is no doubt that you convinced him intellectually of the validity of your approach.

If you lean toward Geneva, you might consider subdividing the conference into individual working groups each of which would deal with a discrete and separate problem. A formula might possibly be worked out by which a

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limited success in one or more of the individual working groups might be implemented even in the absence of a general overall agreement. This might be a way of applying a variant of the step by step approach in the Geneva forum.

In conclusion I should like to emphasize that all of us have kept our word and have kept the meeting absolutely confidential.

Please let me know how we can continue to help.

Fondly,

John G. Stoessinger

P.S. Please address all correspondence to my home: 275 Central Park West
New York, New York 10024

Telephone: 212 799-6086

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
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Registered

*Mr. Jerry Bremer
Executive Assistant
The Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520*

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P 45
Stoessinger

Institute on the United Nations

May 13, 1975

Dear Henry:

Enclosed please find a transcript of a recent newspaper interview with Hens in Israel. I believe that it indicates that he has come a considerable distance in your direction.

Elie Wiesel and I are prepared to see Sadat and to give you the reception in New York for Jewish leaders at whatever time seems most useful to you. Elie is planning to visit Auschwitz in connection with his research during the last week in May and has asked me whether you could alert our Ambassador in Poland in case he may need some assistance. I am sure he would be grateful.

Please let me know when you want us to follow through on our plans.

Fondly,

John G. Stoessinger

P.S. Please address all correspondence to my home: 275 Central Park West
New York, New York 10024

An interview with Professor Hans Morgenthau, published in Davar (April 25), by reporter H. Isaac, discloses that although the 71 year old professor is considered a hawk in matters of international policy, he is rather dovish according to Israeli precepts. And if some Israelis who are against giving up territories at all try to cite Prof. Morgenthau's opinions, it seems that they have not understood him fully. It is true that Prof. Morgenthau opposes the step-by-step arrangements and agreements. He feels that Israel should not make its efforts for peace piecemeal, but should rather put to the Arabs the great and decisive question, which emanates from the Security Council Resolution 242: Are the Arabs ready to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a sovereign State? But at the same time, and unlike Likud and other extremists who oppose giving up territories at all, Prof. Morgenthau thinks that Israel must be ready for considerable political concessions and even for a return to the 1967 borders from before the Six-Day War, with some minor adjustments, and he says quite decisively: "This is the only way. There is no other alternative."

Prof. Morgenthau came to Israel to lecture at the Haifa University. He is a German Jew, who settled in the U. S. in 1937 and had a brilliant career at the Universities of Kansas and Chicago, and also at the School for Social Research in New York. He published many books on international affairs, but despite 38 years of sojourn in America he still speaks with a heavy German accent. He does not accept the formula that some Israeli politicians are propagating: "A piece of territory in exchange for a piece of peace." Morgenthau says: "This peace is indivisible. Can one talk about a 'piece' of existence?"

Morgenthau admits that during the first stage after the 1973 war, a partial agreement was useful from the military point of view because it brought about a ceasefire and a separation of forces. But he says: "When we reach the political

stage, I do not believe in partial agreements any more, because the basic problem is: Arab recognition of Israel's existence and an Arab declaration that they give up the idea of removing Israel from the Middle East by force. At the same time I do not think that Israel should have insisted during the Kissinger negotiations on abolishing the state of belligerency. Within the framework of a partial agreement, such a formula with time limitations seems to me like hair-splitting. Because of this formula, Dr. Kissinger's mission should not have failed, and in this respect he is right when he criticizes Israel's attitude. As to non-belligerence Hitler had non-aggression pacts with all his victims. On the other hand, I attach great importance to a general declaration of the Arabs that they give up any intention to destroy Israel and that they recognize Israel's right to exist."

"Some say that one cannot negotiate with the Arabs at present about a total arrangement. The idea that the Arabs are not ready under any circumstances to discuss it is an Israeli invention. I do not accept the argument that it is impossible a priori to come to an agreement with the Arabs. In my view, the Israelis didn't fight hard enough for the implementation of Resolution 242. Even from the public relations point of view, as well as from the point of view of public opinion, it is very important that the Israelis should put to the Arabs the unequivocal question: Are they not ready, or are they ready to recognize Israel's right to exist? Thereby, the Arabs will find themselves in a squeeze, while at present Israel is on the defensive and must answer Arab propaganda which is spreading all over the world. I think that an Arab declaration of this kind is important. But I do not think it is sufficient. It must be accompanied by guarantees that it will be fulfilled. At the same time I do not believe in verbal or written guarantees only. Therefore, I prefer the idea of establishing an American naval base in the Port of Haifa. Such a base will express the American presence in the area, and this is more important than any formal guarantee."

The reporter asked whether it is true that he submitted such a proposal to Kissinger, and Morgenthau said: "I do not want to talk about it. Suffice it to say that I propose it. You asked me if there is a chance for such a proposal to be accepted, and I will tell you that this is first and foremost in the American interest, and public opinion in the United States as well as Congress can be brought to the point of supporting it, if it will be proven that this is important in order to withstand Russian expansionism. Such an American military presence in the Port of Haifa can serve as a deterrent to war. It exists, as you know, in West Germany and in Korea. You may ask whether the United States can afford to arouse Arab opposition by establishing a base in Israel. But in point of fact American policy is committed to Israel's existence and this by itself causes Arab opposition. Nevertheless, America insists on fulfilling its commitment, despite the threats to Israel's existence. You ask me also whether what is called reassessment does not mean a change in the above-mentioned American commitment, and I will tell you that I do not think so. The word 'reassessment' is a polite expression for the word 'wait and see'. The word 'reassessment' was born out of Dr. Kissinger's feeling that the Israelis have misled him. But what does reassessment mean in actual fact? What can the rulers in Washington discover that they didn't know before? People talk about an erosion in public opinion with regard to Israel. Israel doesn't get a good press, and Israel's information services are rather weak. The Arabs have made a tremendous propaganda effort and they were very successful, indeed. Arab propaganda uses very simple slogans. It says: Look at these poor Palestinians, who were uprooted from their fatherland and from their homes. The wrong which has been done to them must be corrected.

"We are fully aware that such a description of the Palestinian cause distorts realities to a large extent. But the man in Oklahoma or in Missouri doesn't know this, and he becomes convinced that the Arabs have a just grievance, and ~~that~~ Israel doesn't counteract this propaganda effectively. The Arabs may use the oil embargo

weapon again, if they will be defeated in a new war. I doubt very much whether the Americans are ready to intervene militarily in the case of a renewal of the oil embargo. If the Arabs use the oil embargo weapon, Western unity may collapse. If I were an Arab leader, I wouldn't hesitate to use the oil embargo weapon. If there is a new war, I think that it will end without a ~~decision~~ clearcut decision, as has happened in the previous wars. But the new war will be more dangerous and more costly in blood. Therefore, a supreme effort must be made to prevent a new war, even if it is not easy to obtain from the Arabs full recognition of Israel's right to exist, and even if there is no guarantee that they will observe this in the future. In my view, there is no choice but to try to go along this road. If we give up there will be a war. The condition of no war and no peace, as is now the case, cannot continue. You ask me who will be the loser in the long range in a war, or in several wars. It is true that the Arabs can afford more military debacles, hoping that in the end they will liquidate Israel. They think that in the long range the Arabs will have the advantage if there will be no outside intervention. But let us not forget that Israel is not entirely isolated in its struggle for existence. Today and in the foreseeable future, it can rely in its existence on the support of the two superpowers, and I mean two, because the U.S.S.R. also has an interest in the continued existence of Israel. The presence of Israel in the Middle East serves for the Russians as a mighty lever in their attempts to penetrate the Middle East and gain more and more satellites. I think that this is the reason why the U.S.S.R. is actually opposed to the idea of the liquidation of the State of Israel. The Soviet policy is the most Machiavellian I have ever encountered. It is entirely based on Soviet interests. Therefore, I do not think that if Israel would have led a less pro-Western policy, that this would have changed the Soviet policy of political support to the Arabs. But from the point of view of the Soviet interest, importance must be attached to Israel's existence. Therefore, the Soviet formula is: We must

satisfy the strivings of the Arabs, but we must also preserve the existence of Israel. If you wish, the balance between the two also expresses the basic attitude of American policy, although in the case of America it is much more delicate and much less tough.

"You ask me whether Israel may have to embark on a preventive war. I wouldn't like to answer such a hypothetical question. But if the Arabs prepare again for an immediate attack, as they did in 1967, a preventive war is justified.

"In 1973 Golda Meir said that Israel avoided a preventive war because it didn't want to arouse the ire of the Americans. It seems to me that such a statement is mainly a post-factum explanation. I doubt whether the Israelis were ready for a preventive war at that time, and whether such a preventive war would have achieved its objectives under the prevailing circumstances. I am also inclined to think that the Israelis did not believe in the ability of the Arabs to attack and that's why they didn't consider at all a preventive war. It may sound well to say that Israel avoided action because of political considerations. But in the last resort, it is not good public relations to use this argument. For Israel it was very unfavorable that the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli Army collapsed. But here one can say: Nothing succeeds more than success, and nothing fails more than failure.

"As to the possibility of a 'balance of atomic terror' in the Middle East -- I can visualize such a possibility. The danger of an atomic war may arise only if and when Israel will see a danger to its very existence and in that case Israel may manifest the so-called 'Samson Symptom'.

"You ask me whether Israel takes the right attitude towards the PLO, in view of the fact that so many countries support the idea of Palestinian independence. I will tell you that I think that the Israeli attitude is definitely justified. If someone denies your right to exist, you cannot negotiate with him. How can you negotiate with a person who puts a revolver on the table and threatens to

kill you. Israel must ~~xxxx~~ expose to the world the trickery of PLO propaganda. Israel must emphasize that Palestine was already divided once, and the very idea of establishing a new minute state is a crazy idea and will bring lots of trouble."

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Prof. Morgenthau/has opposed American involvement in the Vietnam War since 1965, although he never was a Leftist, denies the accusation that America didn't keep its promise to South Vietnam. "This is sheer stupidity," he says. "America invested in this war \$150 billion and sacrificed 50,000 casualties. To say that America betrayed the Vietnamese is totally absurd. The quisling governments in South Vietnam were hated by the masses and showed themselves helpless in the end. We couldn't possibly take their place."

"As to Israeli information, much can be done, Arab propaganda causes in the U.S. damage not only to Israel, but also spreads anti-Semitism. It is not the old kind of anti-Semitism. Since the days of Auschwitz, it is not nice to attack Jews as individuals. Present-day anti-Semitism tries to arouse hatred against the Jewish State, and this collective hatred has, of course, a negative influence on the treatment of the Jewish individual who supports the hated country. You ask me if there is a possibility that some Jews may hesitate to openly support Israel. Such a possibility exists, of course. The phenomenon of 'Court Jews' is a fact. Presidents of Jewish organizations feel good when they are invited for a talk to the White House, and especially when they are invited for dinner. Such Jews will think twice before they antagonize the ruling circles in the U. S. by expressing unpopular opinions. This is a danger which cannot be overlooked."